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Abstract
This is an analysis of the recently published article ‘Quantum theory cannot consistently describe
the use of itself’ by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner [1]. Here I decipher the paradox and analyze
it from the point of view of de Broglie-Bohm hidden variable theory (i.e., Bohmian mechanics).
I also analyze the problem from the perspective obtained by the Copenhagen interpretation (i.e.,
the Bohrian interpretation) and show that both views are self consistent and do not lead to any
contradiction with a ‘single-world’ description of quantum theory.
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I. HARDY’S PARADOX
The claim of this article is that the recently published article [1, 2] by D. Frauchiger
and R. Renner about Wigner’s Friends [3] and entanglement is mainly a rephrasing of the
beautiful Hardy paradox [4, 5] about quantum non-locality without inequality (for a clear
and nice derivation see also [6] by S. Goldstein; see also the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) paradox [7]). The authors of [1] recognize the importance of Hardy’s letter in their
own analysis but the argument is written in such a way that the relation is no immediately
transparent. My aim is here to clarify this point from the point of view of Bohmian mechanics
(i.e. de Broglie Bohm interpretation). During the analysis I will also consider the perspective
taken by various Bohrians (i.e. adepts of the Copenhagen interpretation) and show the
intimate relation this has with a Bohmian perspective. The problem is also connected to a
work by C. Brukner [8, 9] where an argument similar to [1] is obtained but based on Bell’s
inequality for the singlet spin state (and for the GHZ paradox [7, 8]). Our analysis also
apply to this work.
The argument of [1, 4] is the following: Take two Qbits and entangle them in such a way
as to obtain the pure quantum state:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
3
|h, ↓〉+ 1√
3
|t, ↓〉+ 1√
3
|t, ↑〉, (1.1)
where h and t refer to head and tail of the quantum coin used in [1] and ↓, ↑ to the spin
state of the system S consider in the same article. Hardy’s paradox comes when we consider
4 kinds of measurements which are in counter factual conflicts with each other and based
on the nonlocality and contextuality of quantum lead to a contradiction or paradox.
Consider indeed quantum states [10] |ok〉 = |h〉−|t〉√
2
, |fail〉 = |h〉+|t〉√
2
(basis W ), |ok〉 =
|↑〉−|↓〉√
2
, |fail〉 = |↑〉+|↓〉√
2
(basis W) used in [1]. We s start with the experiment where we
measure if the first Qbit is in the state h or t and use basis W for measuring the second
Qbit.
From Eq. 1.1 if we get |t〉 then we must have |fail〉. However if we measure |h〉 we can
get with the same probability |ok〉 or |fail〉 [11]. Therefore, we have the logical inference:
‘if we measure |ok〉 for the second Qbit then we have |h〉 for the first one’ (we call this
inference I).
For symmetric reasons [11] in a different experiment by using the basis W and {| ↑〉, | ↓〉}
we get the inference:
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‘if we measure |ok〉 for the second Qbit then we have | ↑〉 for the first one’ (we call this
inference I).
Apriori, in a local world, if the two Qbits are far way we should from I and I deduce:
‘ if we could observe the Qbits in the state |ok, ok〉 then we should also have in a counterfactual
reasoning a contribution |h, ↑〉 in the initial state’.
However, the state of Eq. 1.1 doesn’t contain any contribution |h, ↑〉 therefore from this
apriori correct reasoning we should never observe a state like |ok, ok〉 in our measurement
(we call this inference I + I). An equivalent way to obtain this result is to say that we
have the chain of logical implications[8]: ok →↑→ t → fail. However, and this is Hardy’s
paradox, if you actually do the measurement in the bases W and W then we will get with
a probability of occurrence
PΨ(ok, ok) =
1
12
(1.2)
the state |ok, ok〉 which is contradicting the previous counterfactual reasoning I + I. This
is a remarkable proof of ’nonlocality’ without inequality showing that if we want to give
a mechanical explanation of quantum mechanics (i.e., with hidden variables) then we we
must include a nonlocal action at a distance which prohibits us to take too seriously the
previous inference mixing I and I. In a Bohmian approach for example [12, 13], there is
an additional quantum force or potential acting nonlocally on the two Qbits when we use
the measurement bases W and W . This additional quantum force is context dependent
meaning that the experiments leading to inferences I, I and to Eq. 1.2 are not possible
in the same context and imply different hidden variable dynamics and quantum forces.
The contradiction results (in the Bohmian approach) from forgetting the nonlocal and
contextual quantum force acting on particle trajectories.
II. WIGNER’S FRIENDS AND HARDY’S PARADOX
So what is new in Ref. [1]? The authors actually introduces four agents or observers and
develop a story plot similar in philosophy to the famous Wigner friend paradox [3] but now
based on the nonlocality a la Hardy and involving two Wigner friends. In other words, they
introduce macroscopic devices with memories (using John Bell unconventional convention
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let call them PhD students). Two first agents F and F are supposed to be strongly entan-
gled with the Qbits and somehow measure the states of the two Qbits in the basis {| ↑〉, | ↓〉}
for F and {|h〉, |t〉} for F . Now, in the story plot the quantum coin and F are in a Lab L
isolated from the rest of the Universe up to small communicating channels. We also suppose
the same for the quantum spin and the observer F which are together in a lab L also well
isolated from the Universe and in particular from L. The quantum state Eq. 1.1 is thus
becoming a statement about the entanglement of the two labs. For example the basis vector
|h, ↓〉 means that the observer F and its local environment in L is in the state ↓ whereas
the observer F in his lab L is in the state h (see Eq. 2 of [1]).
Now, Eq. 1.1 means that from Quantum theory we preserve phase coherence between the
various alternatives or branches which are (h, ↓), (t, ↓) and (t, ↑). In a world where there
is a kind of Heisenberg cut between the quantum-uncollapsed Universe and the classical
looking like collapsed Universe these 3 alternatives can not see each other and we could
replace every thing by density matrices. However, in [1] the entanglement is supposed to be
preserved (no decoherence occured yet), quantum mechanics is supposed to be universally
valid (there is no objective collapse), and some super observers called Wigner friends W and
W are recording the quantum states of labs L and L.
In this new level of description observers W and W can communicate meaning that
the world is classical or collapsed (i.e. decohered) for them. Still, they are able to make
projective measurements on the basis vectors ok, fail and ok, fail which are macroscopic
superposition of observers F , and F quantum states. Alternatively, W and W could record
the states of F , and F in the h, t and ↑, ↓ bases. Now, all these experiments are defining
contexts which are sometimes incompatibles and we again have the complete Hardy paradox
with the contradiction surrounding statement I + I and Eq. 1.2. Every thing is the same
but now every thing is macroscopic and therefore looks even more fantastic. Inferences I:
‘ok → h’ and I: ‘ok →↑’ now have a macroscopic meaning involving PhD students and
the conclusion I + I: ‘ok, ok → h, ↑’ looks also natural from a classical perspective. But of
course we are no classical here if we preserve the phases and if Wigner friends can use F and
F as if they were simple Qbits. Therefore, we have no reason to believe in I + I. For the
super observers W and W the paradox thus dissolves since nonlocality precludes the use of
a common experimental context for I, I and Eq. 1.2 in agreement with [4].
Nevertheless, agents F and F would no be happy to be treated as simple Qbits: for sure
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they would disagree with the idea that they are in a quantum superposition, i.e., entangled
with each other. Don’t forget all these paradoxes and issues with Schrodinger cats and
Wigner Friends come from the strict application of Bohr interpretation adapted to an ex-
perimentalist in the lab and dealing with atoms or photons. For Bohr, a spin in a quantum
superposition has no clear description before the observation (I speak about description no
about ontological existence which is a different thing). Therefore, for super observers W and
W the less-super observers F and F with PhD families, (Schrodinger) cats etc.. are in the
previous story plot also in a ‘foggy’ state (Wheeler used the term ‘Great Smoky Dragon’ as
a metaphor) while F and F will no accept it. The problem is no new: what is the meaning
of me being in a quantum state happy and unhappy |∪¨〉 + |∩¨〉 ? How do I feel in such a
state? What happens to a conscious cat [14] in a quantum interferometer? In my humble
opinion the only self-consistent interpretation actually available for answering all these ques-
tions (i.e. ontological and epistemic) is the Bohmian one [14]. Only in this mathematically
sharp interpretation can we write quantum superpositions and still have a clear ontolog-
ical description of both microscopic and macroscopic systems even without observer (this
doesn’t however preclude the development of a better theory or of an empirically equivalent
one). A quantum cat can be in a interferometer and still follow one single trajectory while a
quantum guiding wave (or empty wave: Bohmians are still debating about it) goes through
many paths. The Many Worlds Interpretation is also a candidate for an ontological theory
but in [14] we showed that this approach collapses completely because it can not seriously
describe what is a probability. In the Bohmian approach there is no problem into defining
a chain of observers a la von Neumann or Wigner: each observer will be real and possess a
univocal state of affair. Objective collapse theories such as spontaneous collapse a la Pearle,
GRW, Penrose, Diosi or Tumulka[15] (may be should we also include in this list Wigner’s
approach where the mind-body frontier plays a key role in the wave-function collapse) are
also interesting but they require a new level of unknown physics going beyond far quantum
mechanics. In the example given in [1] Bohmian mechanics predicts that the superposition
Eq. 1.1 will involve (extremely weak) nonlocal quantum forces which could in the hypothet-
ical scenario lead indeed to the rejection of I+ I and to the empirical justification of Eq. 1.2.
Still F and F will have clearly defined trajectories without any foggy elements (this is what
Einstein called a complete theory).
In order to clarify the role of Bohmian mechanics for understanding the paradox discussed
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in [1] we should first go back to the structure of the axiomatic discussed in this work.
A. Q,C,S axioms in [1]: How an agent should apply Quantum mechanics?
[1] uses three assumptions (Q)-quantum mechanics is valid, (C)-mutual consistency be-
tween observers is required, and (S)-self consistency for an observer is also imposed which
are leading to a no-go theorem. While the definition of these 3 assumptions is relatively clear
the application of the rules to the problem discussed in [1] is ambiguous. The problem is
with the definition of the observers F and F and even more with the use they do of quantum
mechanics. As I wrote an observer is a macroscopic device with a memory (here a quan-
tum memory). Of course an observer will not stay or live for ever and therefore we must at
least admit that during the experiment the observer memory should not be quantum-erased.
Quantum-erased should not be confused with simply ‘destroyed’ because in general destruc-
tion (by heat) transfers some information to the environment which is enough to decohere
the various quantum branches and thus to keep a track of the observation and generate a
which path information. This criterion is directly applicable to W and W but not to F
and F because the states |fail〉 = |h〉+|t〉√
2
etc... are all linear combinations of the primary
states |h〉, |t〉 etc.... If we dont want to ask our self what is meaning of |∪¨〉 + |∩¨〉 we can
alternatively imagine (see Fig. 1) that the observers F and F before the experiment have an
empty memory |‘∅′〉F , |‘∅′〉F . In the first step of the experiment they interact locally with
their respective Qbits and during a time T can keep a memory of that result (in the bases
(h, t) and (↓, ↑)) and can think and meditate about the experiment (this is needed in the
proposal [1] where agents try to obtain conclusions about the results and outcomes of other
agents). After this time T their memories are quantum-erased and the observers F and F
leave the labs L and L to discuss with W and W . For example, for observer F watching the
spin we can have a branch:
|‘∅′〉F | ↑〉S → |‘ ↑′〉F | ↑〉S → |‘∅′〉F | ↑〉S. (2.1)
After this operation the observers W and W can do their manipulation on the Qbits Eq. 1.1
in the bases (ok, fail), (ok, fail) and we go back to the discussion of Hardy’s experiment[4].
D. Deutsch, introduced this idea in [16] where he discussed a similar paradox with the
double slit experiment. Deutsch used an important novelty: the memory doesn’t need to be
6
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FIG. 1: Sketch of the Gedanken experiment proposed in [1] but here including a quantum memory
device a la Deutsch [16]. During a time T the observers F and F can interact with the two entangled
Qbits in a Hardy state (see Eq. 1.1). After this time they partially erase their quantum memory
and only remember having obtained a definite outcome. Subsequently, the Wigners W and W can
do different projective measurements by using linear gates or beam splitters on the two entangled
Qbits as explained in sections I and IIB. We emphasize that on the figure the choice for the
outcomes obtained by the different observers are made in reference to panel (a) of Fig. 4 where
Bohmian trajectories are used to graphically represent hidden-variable paths violating Hardy’s non
contextual axiom I+ I.
completely erazed. Only the exact value of the outcome is erased and the agent can keep
in memory the fact that he or she got a single definite outcome. This already introduces a
kind of paradox for those who believe that an observer must necessarily collapse the wave
function. Importantly, for a Bohrian there is no problem and no paradox a la Deutsch [16]
since the fact that F and F lose their memory is saving the consistency of the principle of
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complementarity which prohibits you to have at the same time information associated with
different conflicting experimental contexts. Of course, F and F will be offended to be not
trusted by W and W . Indeed, they actually participated to the experiment and even if they
don’t remember which result or outcome they got at least they could keep the memory that
they got a single result [8, 16] and thus this seems to go beyond what Bohrians claim. In [1]
the observers should have the ability to get and lose a (partial) quantum-memory and this
is necessary if we need to exploit the phase relation and nonlocality contained in Eq. 1.1. D.
Deutsch claimed that this quantum memory is already in conflict with those who think that
a macroscopic observer should necessarily collapse the wave function [16]. This corresponds
to a specific but old reading of Bohrian or Wheelerian philosophy in which ‘no elementary
quantum phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is brought to a close by an irreversible act
of amplification’ and where this irreversible act of amplification is possibly associated with
the mind-body boundary of observers.
Now, one of the issue in [1] is that the observers F and F make some deductions and
inferences by applying (Q) and (C). These deductions can only be done during the period T
when they have a clear memory of the outcomes (e.g., see Eq. 2.1). In [1] it is written that
they apply quantum mechanics, i.e. (Q), to deduce the outcomes obtained by W and W .
For example if F recorded the state |t〉 then he can infer that W will observe the state |fail〉
(this is called F
n:02
in [1] and is deduced from Eq. 1 by applying the Born rule PΨ(t, ok) = 0).
However, this deduction is obtained from an experimental context which is different from
the actual experiment described in [1] where W uses the basis (ok, fail) and W uses the
basis (ok, fail). In other words, F
n:02
‘I am certain that W will observe w=fail at time
n:31’ is contrary to the claim [1] a counterfactual reasoning which is not justified in quan-
tum mechanics and generally leads to wrong conclusions. F wrong deductions are actually
obtained by supposing that the experiment will be the one where (t, h) and (ok, fail) bases
are involved. Moreover, in this alternative experiment it is not necessary to quantum-eraze
the memory of F and the agent can plays the role of a genuine observer. For a Bohrian this
would be the only experimental context in which F is a good observer during all the story
plot of the experiment. In this perspective the wrong application of quantum mechanics
results from the agent F belief that he or she completely collapses the wave function given
in Eq. 1.1 and forget the other branches. As we explained earlier this is exactly what usually
occurs when the memory is not quantum erased (i.e., with a classical memory).
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Other deductions shown in Table 3 of [1] are also problematic: F n:13 ‘I am certain
that F is certain that W will observe w=fail at time n:31’ and F n:14 ‘I am certain that W
will observe w=fail at time n:31 ’ are based on (Q) and (C) and are related to F
n:02
wrong
application of quantum physics based on a partial knowledge of the experimental context.
F n:12 ‘I am certain that F knows that z = +1/2 at time n:02’ is not problematic since it
concerns a deduction of F concerning F during a time where his memory is not quantum
erased and where the experimental context is not changed (actually this corresponds to a
Rovelian approach [17], i.e., to relational quantum mechanics).
Statement W
n:22
‘I am certain that F knows that z = +1/2 at time n:11’ based on the
observation w = ok is problematic and is already discussed in Hardy’s paper: indeed here
W applies locally quantum mechanics to a context which is not the good one (this leads to
the final contradiction) but at least W is a good ‘Bohrian’ observer with a memory track of
the results.
W
n:23
‘I am certain that F is certain that W will observe w=fail at time n:31’ is based
on the previous wrong statements by F so that if W knows that F applies wrongly quan-
tum mechanics but still accept it we can keep this in the Table 3 as ‘valid’. Still, despite
all these wrong applications of quantum mechanics the local and counterfactual statement
ok →↑→ t → fail is equivalent to W n:24 ’I am certain that W will observe w=fail at time
n : 31’. Again this is Hardy’s theorem with the I+ I inference discussed before.
In the run proposed in [1] W announces his result (i.e. ok) and share it with W . For this
reason the statement W n:26 is unproblematic. Like for the previous deductions W n:27 and
W n:28 are based on the wrong application of quantum mechanics by previous observers: we
can however keep this as ‘valid’ if we know their mistakes (statement W n:28 ‘I am certain
that I will observe w = fail at time n:31’ is equivalent toW
n:24
and could have been directly
written since both W and W are on the same observer level for a Bohrian and thus share
information in a legitimate way).
All this story plot is apparently very complicated, i.e., much more than the initial Hardy’s
one ok →↑→ t→ fail based only on the locality and non contextuality assumptions (i.e. the
I+ I inference). As we showed most of the new paradox originates from a wrong application
of quantum mechanics taking for granted the role of an observer or agent as a collapsing
device (i.e. going to a naive reading of quantum mechanics). These problems disappear
together if the observer consider the full wave function needed in the description of the
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problem and if he or she do not forget the contextual nature of any quantum measurement.
The most interesting thing (which was already contained in Deutsch proposal [16] concerns
the definition and analysis of the key role of observers as (quantum) memory devices (an idea
which is not new and goes back to Everett) and the impact this has on a Bohrian reading of
quantum mechanics. For a canonical Bohrian W and W are better observers because they
can analyze the experiment during all the story. Some Bohrians would however agree that
F and F are allowed to be observers only during the time T . Nevertheless, this is not really
the official reading of Bohrian mechanics which has pain to define different levels of reality
for observation of events. Actually, this way of thinking is more in agreement with the
perspective taken by a (neo) Bohrian like a Rovelian (i.e., relational quantum mechanics)
which takes more seriously the view taken by several observers (specifically in the context
of Einstein’s relativity[17, 18]) This is also close from the perspective of Qbism as discussed
in [1, 8].
The previous analysis applies also to the work by C. Brukner [8] where a perfectly en-
tangled pair of spins (i.e., in the singlet quantum state |Ψ1,2〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑1, ↓2〉 − | ↓1, ↑2〉))
is observed by two agents like F and F (in the bases (↑1, ↓1) and (↑2, ↓2) for F and F re-
spectively) in a way similar to the one discussed in [1]. Now, using the method proposed
in this article and following the proposal of Deutsch [16] the observers can quantum erase
their memories and only keep the track that they obtained a definite outcome. We can also
imagine that the two agents communicate their results during the game so that we know
that they agreed having observed opposed results in the ±z directions. For example they can
write ‘ We agree having observed a definite outcome. Each of us have obtained an opposite
outcome but we can not tell you which one’(we call this message M). Some super observers
can now manipulate the two spins still characterized by |Ψ1,2〉 and can subsequently realize
a Bell test violating a inequality. Moreover, if the observers F and F believe that they
collapsed the wave function (e.g. by ignoring that their memories will be quantum erased)
and wrongly apply quantum mechanics they will subsequently deduce thatW and W should
get a result which is not violating a Bell inequality in mere contradiction with experimental
results by W and W . Of course, once we know that they apply wrongly quantum laws there
is no contradiction.
Actually, in [8] this Gedanken experiment was analyzed differently and was proposed
in order to exclude the coexistence of ‘facts’ (i.e. measurement outcomes or records) for
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both the observers and the superobservers (Brukner speaks of observer-independent facts).
Using the memory (M) of the definite outcomes we are indeed tempted to fix the spin
values along the z direction (even if we don’t remember the precise values) and along
any arbitrary directions by using subsequent records obtained by W and W . Brukner
introduces the concept of Boolean algebra and thus claims that the existence of observer-
independent facts implies the existence of joint probabilities PΨ1,2(A,A
′, B, B′) for dif-
ferent spin observables A, A′ and B, B′ recorded by Alice and Bob (the two Wigner
friends). This leads to a Bell inequality (i.e., to the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt bound
S = |〈(A + A′)B + (A − A′)B′〉| ≤ 2) and therefore contradicts quantum mechanics
which predicts the Tsirelson bound SΨ1,2 = 2
√
2. To be more explicit, the hypothesis of
observer-independent facts plays the role of an hidden variable model for testing Bell lo-
cality. Here, the measurement by F and F in the ±z directions leads to the introductions
of a local hidden variable λ ∈ [(↑1, ↓2), (↓1, ↑2), (↑1, ↑2), (↓1, ↓2)] with probability measure
P1,2(λ) such that P1,2(↑1, ↓2) = P1,2(↓1, ↑2) = 1/2 and P1,2(↑1, ↑2) = P1,2(↓1, ↓2) = 0. Lo-
cal measurements by Wigner friend Alice involve conditional probabilities defined by the
angle α of the Stern and Gerlach apparatus measurement axis with the positive z axis:
P1(+a| ↑1) = cos2(α/2) = P1(−a| ↓1), P1(+a| ↓1) = sin2(α/2) = P1(−a| ↑1) (which doesn’t
depend on the state of the second spin ↑2, or ↓2 which is here omitted). Similar results are
obtained on the Bob side recording the second spin state along a direction ±b. This allows
us to define a measurable joint probability P1,2(xa, yb) =
∑
λ P1(xa|λ)P2(yb|λ)P1,2(λ) with
x, y = ±1 in agreement with Bell definition of a local and causal hidden variable model.
This model satisfies Bell inequality S ≤ 2 [19] and therefore contradicts quantum mechanics.
Brukner lists four fundamental axioms for deriving this no-go theorem: universal validity of
quantum mechanics (i.e. the axiom (Q) of [1]), Bell locality, freedom of choices (i.e., the ab-
sence of superdeterminism), and the existence of observer-independent facts (which is similar
to (C-S) of [1]) and concludes prudently that, assuming all the other axioms are satisfied,
information taken by the observers and the super observers cannot be taken to coexist [8].
This view is more balanced than the perspective taken in [1] where the authors conclude on
the impossibility of any single-world description of quantum theory (a preliminary version
of [1] was untitled ‘Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent’
[2]). Brukner already points out [8] that violation of locality as assumed in Bohmian me-
chanics also solve the problem for his EPR version of the Wigner friend experiment. We
11
agree with him since for Bohmian mechanics the existence of observer-independent facts is
an ontological postulate. The strong contextuality and nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics
prohibits the possibility to write P1,2(xa, yb) =
∑
λ P1(xa|λ)P2(yb|λ)P1,2(λ) since subsequent
measurements made by observers W andW (i.e. Alice and Bob) will necessarily include new
quantum forces and potentials acting nonlocally on the dynamics of the Qbits. The process
(M) on the quantum memory protects the phase coherence of the EPR state and therefore
implies a violation of Bell inequality in agreement with quantum mechanics. We emphasize
that Brukner [8] also included a version of its theorem based on GHZ [7] nonlocality proof
without inequaltiy but with three entangled Qbits. The GHZ theorem brings conclusions
similar in philosophy too Hardy’s proof. Therefore, the approach advocated by Brukner
is less ambiguous than the one provided in [1] using the point of view of several observers
applying badly quantum mechanics. The no-go theorem [8] doesn’t contradict Bohmian
theory and we consider it as valid for all nonlocality proofs available in the literature.
A related issue not yet discussed concerns Lorentz invariance which was the main subject
of Hardy’s article [4] (see the discussion in [5]). Indeed, Hardy stressed that while Bell’s
theorem proves that all realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics must be nonlocal it
is natural to ask if they are also non-Lorentz invariant. This makes sense since Bohmian
mechanics is non Lorentz invariant and requires a preferred frame for defining particle trajec-
tories [13] (we will go back to that in section IIB). Hardy [4] developed a reasoning based on
elements of reality a la Einstein which was criticized in [5] because it involves counterfactual
deductions neglecting non-locality and contextuality of quantum mechanics. This problem
has a certain importance since in [1, 2, 8, 9] one could tempted to use similar deductions
with Wigner friends. However, this would lead again to counterfactual contradictions since
Wigner friends F and F must be treated as quantum memory devices a la Deutsch [16] and
therefore do not escape to the critical analysis and refutations of the early claims made by
Hardy [5]. Specifically it would be wrong to use deductions made byW andW together with
Lorentz transformations and moving Lorentz frames (like F and F ′ used in the next sub-
section) to deduce locally and couterfactually the states of F and F in the past (as defined
in the common earth reference frame). This would be in conflict with quantum mechanics
and Bohmian interpretation.
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B. Bohmian mechanics in a relativistic Universe
The next important point to be discussed in this article concerns Bohmian trajectories
for the proposal [1, 2] (the standard EPR case of [8, 9] leading to Bell’s theorem will not be
discussed here since one can already find several Bohmian accounts in the literature [20]).
In [1] it is claimed that we can find two camps of Bohmians believing either that (Q) is
unproblematic and (C) is violated or inversely that (C) is unproblematic and (Q) is violated.
The authors of [1] do not give too much details [21] but their conclusion is certainly mistaken:
there is only one way to use Bohmian mechanics and there is no ambiguity. In my opinion
the main issue is that as discussed in section IIA above observers F , F and W and W all
apply wrongly (i.e. locally and non-contextually) quantum mechanics in many statements of
[1] and this leads to Hardy’s paradox. If the observers apply correctly the law of physics then
there is no contradiction at all (therefore may be the two camps attribute different meaning
to Q and C and this leads to a contradiction). To illustrate this view I here give the set of
all Bohmian trajectories associated with the Qbits involved in Hardy’s experiment. If the
various agents know Bohmian quantum mechanics they can predict all the paths followed by
the systems during the experiments (here to simplify I admit that the quantum erasing of
the F and F memory process is done so that that I will not have to go back to that point and
stick to the historical Hardy’s experiment [4]) up to a subtlety about space time preferred
foliations that I will discuss. Also, since these observers know that everything is nonlocal
and highly contextual they would obtain the good deductions that a Bohrian or new-Bohrian
(i.e. a Rovelian) should obtain when he/she applies correctly quantum mechanics.
Consider (i.e., Fig. 2) first the Bohmian trajectories obtained if we use the bases (t, h)
and (ok, fail) or if we are using the bases (ok, fail) and (↑, ↓). These are specific but
different experimental contexts described in [4]. The orange panel labeled (b) in Fig. 2
corresponds to the situation leading to the inference ok → h (I) of section I. The orange
panel (c) in Fig. 2 corresponds to the situation leading to the inference ok →↑ (I) of section
I. The local and noncontextual combination of (b) and (c) leads to I+ I which is at the core
of Hardy’s paradox. Equivalently, the panel (c) can be used with (a) to give the inference
ok →↑→ t→ fail discussed in [1] and section I. I emphasize that the Bohmian model used
here assumes that the initial states |h〉, and |t〉 are not spatially overlapping (same for the
states | ↑〉 and | ↓〉 associated with the second Qbit). This hypothesis indeed allows a simple
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FIG. 2: The panels with a red circle correspond to experiments where the bases (t, h) and (ok, fail)
are actualized (here I used the notation false for fail). The probability associated with Bohmian
mechanics are given in each panel (the sum of all probabilities gives one). For each panel the
Bohmian trajectories are represented as a vector (for each panel the time flows vertically from
bottom to top and these pictures are more like some kind of Feynman diagrams in a Bohmian
world). Same for the panels with a blue circle we have now different experiments where the
(ok, fail) and (↑, ↓) bases are used (experiments with red and blue circles are not compatible and
correspond to different contexts in a Bohrian sense). A red circle corresponds to some form of
linear gate like a beam-splitter allowing us to convert initial states in the basis (↑, ↓) to state like
in the basis (ok, fail). Similarly the blue circle is a beam splitter mapping states in the basis (t, h)
onto the (ok, fail) basis. The 3 orange panels are playing a key role in Hardy’s paradox [1, 4] and
are discussed in the main text.
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pictorial discussion of Bohmian paths without entering on subtleties about the definition of
spins in Bohmian mechanics [12, 20].
Now, if we want to draw Bohmian paths associated with the experiments where the
FIG. 3: The different panels show Bohmian paths graphically represented when the agents W and
W use the bases (ok, fail) and (ok, fail) in their measurement. The paths are calculated by using
the preferred foliation F discussed in the main text. The symbols and notations are otherwise the
same as in Fig. 2. The orange panel labeled (a) corresponds to the outcomes ok, ok of Eq. 1.2
playing a central role in Hardy’s paradox (compare with Fig. 4). The probabilities are evaluated
using conservation law and causality seen from the point of view of F (the coefficients α, β, γ ∈ [0, 1]
obey to the sum rule 7 = 4(α + β)− 2γ).
observers W and W use the bases (ok, fail) and (ok, fail) we have to be more prudent.
Indeed, Bohmian mechanics is a nonlocal theory and for an experiment like the one of Hardy
[1, 4] we have to care about the Lorentz frame used to calculate the Bohmian paths. More
precisely, Bohmian mechanics require a preferred Lorentz frame in which a time ordering
will be defined for calculating the paths [12, 22, 23]. But since the events associated with
local labs L (i.e. W ) and L (i.e. W ) are space-like separated the order of events could be
different in different Lorentz frame and the Bohmian paths could be different (i.e. the path
are foliation dependent). This strongly impacts the notion of probability of presence and
equivariance in Bohmian mechanics [22, 23].
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FIG. 4: Like for Fig. 3 the different panels show Bohmian paths graphically represented when the
agents W and W use the bases (ok, fail) and (ok, fail) in their measurement. The paths are now
calculated by using the preferred foliation F ′ 6= F discussed in the main text. The symbols and
notations are otherwise the same as in Fig. 2. The orange panel labeled (a) corresponds to the
outcomes ok, ok of Eq. 1.2 playing a central role in Hardy’s paradox (compare with Fig. 3).
In Fig. 3 we show what will happen if we suppose that the preferred frame used to
calculate the path is such that the agent W detects the particle (spin) in the basis (ok, fail)
before the entangled particle (coin) cross the other beam splitter (in blue). In other words in
this reference frame F the coin is still in a t or h state while the spin is detected by W . This
allows simple graphical representations of the possible Bohmian paths XF (t) for the two
Qbits (shown in Fig. 3 in the laboratory reference frame where W and W are simultaneous).
From all the possible trajectory sets the orange panel labeled (a) plays a key role in Hardy’s
experiment since it corresponds to the outcome ok, ok with the probability PΨ(ok, ok) =
1
12
of Eq. 1.2. Importantly, this is the only panel of Fig. 3 where such an outcome occurs.
It is associated with a coin starting in the h state while the spin is in the ↓ state. This
contradicts the I + I inference which prohibits such a possibility. Again nonlocality is at
play here and trajectories are strongly modified by the change of contexts even in space-like
separated regions of the Universe.
That’s not all. In a Bohmian world we can also use the alternative preferred foliation
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F ′ [24] where the agent W detects the coin before the spin even reached the red beam
splitter. In this alternative foliation F ′ (see Fig. 4) we can also graphically represents (in the
laboratory reference frame where W and W are simultaneous) the possible Bohmian paths
associated with the same experiment in the (ok, fail) and (ok, fail) bases. Remarkably
the paths XF ′(t) and XF(t) are different and associated with different particle distributions
(i.e., Born’s rule is foliation dependent at the hidden variable level). The most important
feature is again the orange panel labeled (a) in Fig. 4 which shows trajectories ending in the
ok, ok with the probability PΨ(ok, ok) =
1
12
of Eq. 1.2. This is again the only panel of Fig. 4
associated with such an outcome and we can see that these paths starting in the t, ↑ are
radically different from those obtained in the orange panel (a) of Fig. 3! This confirms that
different foliation in this nonlocal Bohmian theory implies in general different trajectories
for entangled states [22, 23, 25].
The involvement of foliations in relativistic Bohmian dynamics [22, 23] is central in the
understanding of such a theory. For the present discussion it plays a key role for agents
knowing Bohmian mechanics and trying to calculate the paths they follow. Imagine that
the agents F and F know that they are in the t, ↑ state. As we know from statement F n:12
this is completely allowed. If the agents know that the wave function guiding their paths
is given by Eq. 1.1 they can predict the outcomes of the experiments with the different
probabilities (see Figs. 3,4). However, in order to define precisely the dynamics they also
need to know which foliation plays a preferred role in the dynamics, i.e., they need to know
which Lorentz frame is a ‘subquantum Aether’ a la Bohm-Vigier [12]. If they don’t know
this frame they will not be able to define univocally the paths.
III. CONCLUSION
To summarize we discussed the proposal [1] based on Hardy’s paradox and showed that
the analysis in term of Wigner friends and agents doesn’t lead to new paradox not already
contained in the previous works about nonlocality and contextuality of quantum mechanics.
We showed that many paradoxical statements in [1, 2] are actually deduced by agents who
are badly applying quantum mechanics. Those agents, ignoring the actual evolution of the
wave function and experiments, forget that they are themselves genuine quantum systems
with quantum memories and this can induce apparent contradictions. Of course, the realiza-
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tion of genuine quantum memories a la Deutsch [16] is a difficult technical issue but nothing
prohibits us to develop ‘baby-Wigner’ friends more in the direction of quantum which-path
or quantum-eraser experiments involving only photons or like the Schrodinger kittens using
Rydberg atoms and developed by Serge Haroche group. Moreover, any Bohrian or Rovelian
agent applying correctly quantum mechanics can infer that ‘by applying correctly quantum
rules, i.e., by taking into account the full wave function |Ψ(t)〉 of the system I can predict
unambiguously the outcome probabilities for experiments made by other agents’. Further-
more the same agent can deduce fairly that ‘if I have a quantum memory which will be
erased during the protocol I will not be able to violate Bohr’s complementarity or the un-
certainty principle’. In other words, the mere fact that Wigner friends F and F remember
that they participated to the experiment [1] or [8] but can not tell precisely which outcomes
occurred protects the self consistency of Bohr complementarity which is all about informa-
tion available to an observer not about ontology of the hidden world. To paraphrase Bell:
‘complementary is safe FAPP’ (i.e., for all practical purposes).
We also showed that there is no contradiction in [1, 8] forbidding us to apply a ‘single-
world’ interpretation of quantum mechanics such as Bohmian mechanics [26] to any exper-
iment involving one or several Wigner and Wigner friends. A Bohmian agent can fairly
states: ‘knowing the quantum state |Ψ(t)〉 of the system I will be able not only to predict
the probability outcomes (like for a Bohrian agent) but I will also be able to deduce the com-
plete dynamics and trajectories of Qbits and agents involved in the process’. Furthermore,
he or she could add: ‘ While my quantum memory can be erased during the process I will
forgot which state I actually had and this will be done in order to protect complementarity
and the Heisenberg principle for any other observers’. Therefore, at the end a Bohmian can
be a Bohrian/Rovelian FAPP but the reverse is certainly not true. In my option having a
clear deterministic vision of a quantum dynamics a la de Broglie Bohm helps for giving a
clean foundation to the orthodox interpretation (this was already claimed by Bohm [12]).
Moreover, this will be true even if at the end we accept that a part of the ontology is hidden
or protected from our intervention as agents or observers.
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